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The Sovereign Should Be Liable For The
Wrongful Injury Of Prisoners
Section 844.6 of the California Government Code provides,
with certain exceptions, that public entities are immune from liability
for injuries to prisoners. The section also provides for immunity
for injuries caused by prisoners. This comment analyzes the
remedies available to a prisoner in California who is wrongfully
injured while incarcerated. The arguments for and against the
rule of entity immunity are discussed. In conclusion, the author
suggests that a new provision is needed to assure that prisoners
receive compensation for injuries wrongfully sustained in prison.
California has provided criminal penalties for inhumane or oppres-
sive treatment to prisoners since 1872.' In 1913 it was unlawful to use
cruel or unusual punishment in the state prisons or reformatories.
2
"Cruel or unusual punishment" was not defined, but the use of thumb-
screws, strait jackets, gags and shower baths was specifically prohibited.3
In 1933 the Penal Code was amended to prohibit the use of "corporal"
punishment and the prohibitions were extended to "any other State,
county or city institution."4
The Penal Code provides criminal penalties for any unlawful assault
and battery on a prisoner,' but can the prisoner maintain a civil action
to seek compensation for any injuries sustained in the unlawful as-
sault? The common law rule was that at least the jailer would be liable
for his personal negligence or misconduct.' California courts applied
this rule from 1900 until Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District7 was
decided in 1961.8 In 1943 the California Supreme Court extended
the rule of personal liability to include the superiors of two city police-
1. CAL. PEN. CODE § 147.
2. CAL. STATS. 1913, c. 583, § 1, p. 1010; CAL. PEN. CODE § 673.
3. id.
4. CAL. STATS. 1933, c. 919, § 1, p. 2396; CAL. PENAL CODE § 673.
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2650 provides:
the person of a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment is under the protection
of the law and any injury to his person not authorized by law is punishable in
the same manner as if he were not convicted or sentenced.
6. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 94 (1927).
7. 55 Cal. 2d 211 (1961).
8. Towle v. Mathews, 130 Cal. 574 (1900); Boyes v. Evans, 14 Cal. App. 2d 472
(1936); Appier v. Hayes, 51 Cal. App. 2d 111 (1942).
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men. 9 The police officers had beaten to death a prisoner in the city
jail. The court concluded that the heirs of the deceased prisoner had
stated a cause of action against the chief of police and the city manager
for negligent supervision of the city employees. The court, in holding
these defendants liable, reasoned that they were negligent for employ-
hag officers with known vicious propensities.' 0 Since the defendants
were the only ones who could initiate action to remove these civil service
employees, the court said they had a duty as well as a power to initiate
the action and protect the public from abuses by police officers.11
Because the liability of the police chief and city manager was pred-
icated on their own negligence, the court found it unnecessary to apply
the principle of respondeat superior, and consequently did not discuss
the issue of the public entity-employer's liability. Although the public
entity was not liable, the decision was very important because liability
was extended beyond the tortfeasor to financially responsible defendants,
the bonded city officials.
The rule of sovereign immunity has long prevented a plaintiff-pris-
oner's recovery of damages from the public entity-employer.' 2  Prosser
states that the rule of sovereign immunity "was first extended to a
municipality in 1798 in Russell v. Men of Devon, at a time when the
idea of the municipal corporate entity was still in a nebulous state. ' ' 13
A municipal corporation had proprietary activities similar to a private
corporation in addition to its governmental activities. The law had
distinguished between the two functions and provided for immunity in
tort only for governmental activities.' 4 Providing and maintaining jails
has been regarded as a governmental function and municipal corporations
could assert the rule of sovereign immunity to prevent liability for any
injuries to prisoners."5 However, the jailer was personally liable because
the care and handling of prisoners was regarded as a ministerial activity
or duty.'
6
9. Femelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal. 2d 226 (1943).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 241:
Against the bestiality and brutality by police officers of the type depicted in
this case the public has no adequate protection unless the superiors are
answerable for any lack of vigilance in the discharge of their duty.
The court apparently concluded that prisoners were entitled to the protection afforded
by civil liability along with the 'free' public.
12. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 94 (1927); Grove v. County of San Joaquin, 156 Cal.
App. 2d 808 (1958); Bryant v. County of Monterey, 125 Cal. App. 2d 470 (1954).
13. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS 1004 (3d ed. 1964).
14. Id. at 1005.
15. Grove v. County of San Joaquin, 156 Cal. App. 2d 808 (1958); White v.
Board of Commissioners of Sullivan Co., 129 Ind. 396, 28 N.E. 846, 847 (1891),
"... for the negligence of officers whose duties require an exercise of such govern-
mental power as the police power, neither a county nor a city is liable."
16. Winborne v. Mitchell, 111 N.C. 13, 15 S.E. 882 (1892); Farmer V. State for
Use of Russell, 224 Miss. 96, 79 So. 2d 528 (1955).
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This immunity of state and local governments has been criticized "for
well over a century,"1 7 but it was not until 1957 that a state supreme
court abolished the rule of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal
corporations. The Florida Supreme Court in Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach"' held that "to continue to endow this type of organiza-
tion [incorporated city] with sovereign divinity appears to us to predi-
cate the law of the 20th century upon an 18th century anachronism."1 9
Significantly, the plaintiffs in the Hargrove case happened to be the
heirs of a prisoner who died as a result of a fire in the city jail when the
jail was left unattended.
The California Supreme Court, in 1961, followed the example of
the Florida Supreme Court. In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District
20
the court said that "the rule of government immunity from tort liability
. . . must be discarded as mistaken and unjust. ' 21  Although the
Muskopf case involved a negligent act, the scope of the decision was
broad enough to impose liability on a public entity for the intentional
torts of its employees. 22 However, the legislature, in response to Mus-
kop!, passed a moratorium measure to prevent the decision from having
a controlling effect on future California cases.23
The California Legislature, in 1957, had authorized the California
Law Revision Commission to conduct a study on sovereign immunity.
24
The California Tort Claims Act of 1963 was largely the product of the
Commission's study and recommendations.2 The legislation was in-
tended to abolish the common law rule of sovereign immunity and to
regulate the entire field of government tort liability.26  Section 815.2 of
the California Government Code provides for public entity liability for
injuries caused by the entity's employee acting within the scope of his
employment.
27
17. PROSSER, supra note 13, at 1010.
18. 96 So. 2d 130, 60 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1957).
19. 96 So. 2d at 133.
20. 55 Cal. 2d 211 (1961).
21. 55 Cal. 2d at 213. The decision applied to state and local governments.
22. Chromiak v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 2d 860 (1963); Jones v.
City of Los Angeles, 215 Cal. App. 2d 155 (1963).
23. CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1404, § 1, p. 3209. Section 1 of the Act provided
... the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability is hereby re-enacted as
a rule of decision in the courts of this State. . . ." Section 3 provided that Section 1"shall remain in effect until the 91st day after the final adjournment of the 1963 Regular
Session of the legislature, and shall have no force or effect on or after that date."
24. CAL. STATS. 1957, Resolutions, c. 202, p. 4590.
25. See A. VAN ALsTYNE, CALiFORNIA GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABIL"TY (Continu-
ing Education of the Bar, Practice Book No. 24, 1964, Supp. 1969). The Act was not
given a "short title" by the legislature; it was enacted in several separate legislative
acts.
26. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815 and Legislative Committee Comment. See also
1963 CAL. L. REvISIoN Comm'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STuDmns, Vol. 4, at
811 [hereinafter cited as COMMSSION].
27. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2. This section basically provides that the principle
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 2
The rights of prisoners are covered under Chapter 3, Police and
Correctional Activities, Part 2, Division 3.6, of the Government Code
(commencing with section 844). Although section 815.2 provides for
entity liability as a general rule, section 844.6 provides an exception for
tort actions brought by prisoners.28 Section 844.6 retains the common
law principle of government immunity for injuries to prisoners except
those injuries caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by a public
employee and medical malpractice by a public employee. 29  The sec-
tion also retains the rule of personal liability for the employee. 30 Thus,
except for motor vehicle injuries and medical malpractice, section 844.6
limits a prisoner's action for damages to that available under the pre-
Muskopf case law.
Two subsequent sections, 845.4 and 845.6, provide for entity lia-
bility for specific tortious acts of the entity's employees. 1 A public em-
ployee and his entity-employer are liable for any injury32 to a prisoner
proximately caused by an "intentional and unjustifiable" interference
with the prisoner's right to a judicial determination of the legality of
his confinement." In addition, a public entity is liable where a public
employee, acting in the scope of his employment, knew or had reason
to know that the prisoner was in need of immediate medical care and
the employee failed to take reasonable action to summon such medical
care. 
34
Section 844.6, as originally enacted, provided for entity immunity,
of respondeat superior is to apply to public employers. Subdivision (a) provides:
A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omis-
sion of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment
if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause
of action against that employee or his personal representative.
Subdivision (b) provides for entity immunity when the employee is immune "except
as otherwise provided by statute." For a complete discussion of the California Tort
Claims Act see VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 25.
28. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6 as originally enacted (CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1681,
p. 3277):
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law except as provided in sub-
divisions (b), (c), and (d) of this section, a public entity is not liable for:
(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2) An injury to any prisoner.
(b) Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under
Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of
the Vehicle Code.
(d) Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for
injury proximately caused by his negligent or wrongful act or omission . .
the public entity shall pay . . . any judgment based on a claim against a
public employee licensed in one of the healing arts ....
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 845.4, 845.6.
32. "Injury" is defined in CAL. Gov'T CODE § 810.8 to mean "death, injury to a
person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer
to his person, reputation, character, feelings, or estate. . .
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.4.
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845.6.
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"Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, except as provided in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of this section. . . ,35 However, sec-
tion 845.6 (liability for failure to summon medical care) was enacted
at the same time. 6 Did the legislature intend the immunity provided
in section 844.6 to prevail over "all" other provisions of law including
section 845.6? In Sanders v. County of Yuba37 the court relied on the
legislative history in reconciling the two provisionsf 8 The court pointed
out that section 845.6 had been significantly amended on April 3, 1963,
after section 844.6 had been introduced for the first time. 9 On the
same day section 844.6 was deleted, however, it was reinstated on
April 22, 1963.40 Although section 844.6 was the latest expression
of the legislature, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend
to impliedly repeal section 845.6 by this subsequent reinstatement of
section 844.6.41 Both sections were enacted at the same time; the court
relied on the rule that
[a] specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern in
respect to that subject, as against a general provision, although the
latter. . . would be broad enough to include the subject to which
the more particular provision relates.
42
Therefore, the court resolved the conflict presented by the language in
section 844.6 which the legislature neglected to amend when the sec-
tion was reintroduced on April 22, 1963.
The court in Hart v. County of Orange43 pointed out that "section
845.6 deals with the creation of a liability, not with the reiteration
of an immunity and therefore deals with a subject not inherent in sec-
tion 844.6. .... 4
1970 Amendments to the Government Code Provisions Pertaining to
Prisoners
The California Law Revision Commission recognized the conflict
caused by the language of section 844.6 and recommended a revision in
1969.-r Consequently, in 1970 the state legislature amended subdivi-
35. CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1681, § 1, p. 3277.
36. Id. at 3278.
37. 247 Cal. App. 2d 748 (1967).
38. Id. at 752.
39. Id. at 753.
40. Id. at 752.
41. Id. at 753.
42. Id. at 753-754.
43. 254 Cal. App. 2d 302 (1967).
44. Id. at 306. See also, Comment, California Public Entity Immunity From
Tort Claims by Prisoners, 19 HAsT. L.J. 573 (1968), for a complete discussion of
these cases.
45. 1969 CoMMssioN, Vol. 9, at 826.
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sion (a) of section 844.6 to read "Notwithstanding any other provision
of this part, except as provided in this section and in Sections 814,
814.2, 845.4 and 845.6. ... 1 This amendment codified the Sand-
ers and Hart decisions by expressly making the entity's liability for fail-
ure to summon medical help (section 845.6) an exception to the general
rule of entity immunity.
Section 814 also became an express exception to section 844.6 by the
1970 amendment." This section provides a prisoner with the right to
obtain injunctive relief against a public entity or employee. 48  In mak-
ing section 814 an express exception to section 844.6, the legislature
has made it clear that the entity's immunity does not extend to injunc-
tions obtained by prisoners.
Giving a prisoner this right to enjoin a public entity may have unex-
pected beneficial effects. If a prisoner can obtain a decree ordering a
public entity to restrain its employees from abusive treatment of prison-
ers, the entity will be compelled to exercise better control over prison
guards. However, even if a prisoner can enjoin the entity, section 844.6
still prevents him from obtaining compensation from the entity for in-
juries already sustained.
Section 814.2 of the Government Code provides that a person's rights
under the Workmen's Compensation Act49 are not affected by the Tort
Claims Act. Although the 1970 amendment made section 814.2 an ex-
ception to section 844.6, a prisoner's rights under workmen's compensa-
tion, at present, are very limited.50
The change in the language from "provisions of the law" to "provi-
sions of this part" in subdivision (a) of section 844.6 will prevent the
section from impliedly repealing statutes enacted in other codes. 1
The legislature, at the same time, also amended subdivision (c) of
section 844.6.52 Previously, subdivision (c) provided that "nothing
in this section prevents a person other than a prisoner, from recovering
46. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1099, § 5, p. 1957. Subsection (a) now reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this
section and in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, a public entity is not
liable for:
(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner.
(2) An injury to any prisoner.
47. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 814. See Legislative Committee Comment which clearly
establishes that the right to injunctive relief is not impaired by the subsequent sec-
tions of the Tort Claims Act.
48. Id.
49. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3201-6149.
50. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2700; CAL. LABOR CODE § 3365.
51. See Legislative Committee Comment-Assembly 1970 Amendment, CAL.
GOVT CODE § 844.6, "of law", taken literally, could impliedly repeal CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 4900-4906.
52. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1099, § 5, p. 1957.
702
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from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous con-
dition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with section
830) of this part. '58 In Garcia v. State of California54 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal held that the heirs of a deceased prisoner could re-
cover in a wrongful death action as a "person other than a prisoner."' 5
The Law Revision Commission in its 1969 recommendation argued
that no persuasive reason had been advanced for allowing the heirs to
recover when a prisoner himself could not recover if the injuries were
non-fatal.56 Accordingly, subdivision (c) was amended to read
"[e]xcept for an injury to a prisoner. .. " the entity would be liable for
injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property.
57
Subdivision (d) of section 844.6 was also amended. Subdivision (d)
now states that a public entity is liable for a judgment on any claim
against an employee "who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of
the healing arts under any law of this state."58 Previously, the section
provided that the judgment be against a public employee "licensed" in
one of the healing arts under the California Business and Professions
Code.59 "Licensed" could have been interpreted to exclude persons
"certificated" or "registered" under the Business and Professions
Code.60 It also could have been interpreted to exclude persons unlaw-
fully practicing in California without a California license. 61
Section 845.4 of the Government Code was also amended by the
legislature during the 1970 session. Previously under section 845.4 a
prisoner had to await a judicial determination that his confinement
was illegal before he could bring an action for an employee's "inten-
tional and unjustifiable" interference with his right to such judicial
determination.6 2 However, the statute of limitations on his claim for
injury may have expired before the determination could be made that
his confinement was illegal.63 The section, as amended, now provides
that no cause of action shall accrue for the injury until the confinement
is deemed illegal.64
53. CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1681, p. 3277.
54. 247 Cal. App. 2d 814 (1967).
55. Id.
56. 1969 CoMmssIoN, Vol. 9, at 825. The court in Garcia concluded that the
legislature intended to include heirs of the prisoner within the meaning of "person
other than a prisoner" since the heirs' cause of action for wrongful death under sec-
tion 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is original and distinct and not derivative.
57. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1099, § 5, p. 1957.
58. Id. at 1958.
59. CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1681, p. 3277.
60. See Legislative Committee Comment CAL. Gov'T CODE § 844.6.
61. Id.
62. CAL. STATS. 1963, c. 1681, p. 3278.
63. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 845.4 and Law Revision Commission Comment.
64. CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1099, § 6, p. 1958.
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The second sentence of section 845.6 of the Government Code was
also amended to conform with section 844.6(d).60 The liability of the
entity for the failure of its employees to summon medical help does not
exonerate an employee lawfully engaged in one of the healing arts from
personal liability for malpractice. 6
Suspension of Civil Rights
A prisoner incarcerated in one of California's state prisons may not
be able to exercise his rights under the Government Code provisions be-
cause of the civil disability statutes.67  California's civil disability stat-
utes are construed strictly and are applied only to persons convicted in
courts of the state and incarcerated in state prisons. 8
Prisoners in state prisons have to wait until they are discharged or
released on parole in order to bring an action for damages under the
provisions of the Government Code. 9 The California Adult Authority
may restore a prisoner's right to bring an action, 70 but it can be ar-
gued that the immediate exercise of a prisoner's legal rights should not
be left to the discretion of any state agency. In order to fully guarantee
a state prisoner's rights under the Government Code, the Penal Code
should be amended. 1 An appropriate amendment would allow inmates
of the state prisons the right to bring an action for damages while incar-
cerated, corresponding to the right of action allowed city and county
prisoners. Even though the statute of limitations may be tolled until
the prisoner is "out", the lapse of time may hinder his ability to pro-
duce evidence at the trial.72  Therefore, it cannot be argued that the
temporary suspension of a prisoner's right to sue is a moot issue.
A Prisoner's Right of Action Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes
A further argument for allowing a state prisoner the right to bring
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600.
A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any term suspends all the
civil rights of the person so sentenced .... But the Adult Authority may
restore to said person during his imprisonment such civil rights as the au-
thority may deem proper....
There are some exceptions provided to the general suspension, but the right to act as
a plaintiff in a civil suit is not one of them. See 18 CJ.S. Convicts § 7 (1939,
Supp. 1970).
68. Hayashi v. Lorenz, 42 Cal. 2d 848 (1954).
69. See Comment, Convicts-Loss of Civil Rights-Civil Death in California, 26
So. CAL. L. REv. 425, 429 (1953), citing available case law for the view that acting as
plaintiff in a civil suit is one of the civil rights suspended for inmates of state prisons.
70. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600.
71. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2600 could be amended to add the provisions of Chapter
3, Part 1, Division 3.6, of the Government Code as another exception to the suspension
of civil rights.
72. C. Foote, Tort Remedies For Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN.
L. REv. 493 (1955).
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an immediate action in the state courts is that he can bring an action in
the federal courts regardless of the California Penal Code."3 In Mc-
Collum v. Mayfield74 the federal district court rejected defendant's as-
sertion that section 2600 of the California Penal Code deprived plain-
tiff of the capacity to sue and held in reference to rights of prisoners un-
der 42 U.S.C. 1983 that the "plaintiff is a person within the jurisdiction
of the United States in spite of the fact that he is an imprisoned felon,
and consequently is empowered to sue in the federal courts under this
section. ' 75 The federal courts generally hold that insufficient or negli-
gent medical care is not a violation of a prisoner's federal civil rights. 76
However, in the McCollum case the court concluded that:
A refusal to furnish medical care when it is clearly necessary, such
as is alleged here, could well result in the deprivation of life itself;
it is alleged that plaintiff suffered paralysis and disability from
which he will never recover. This amounts to the infliction of
permanent injuries, which is, to some extent, a deprivation of life,
of liberty, and of property. Since these rights are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the com-
plaint sufficiently alleges the deprivation of a right, privilege or im-
munity secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.77
The McCollum case illustrates the distinction between negligent med-
ical care and no medical care; the latter, in some cases, can be a viola-
tion of a prisoner's civil rights.78
The United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in Brown
v. Brown79 held that an allegation by a prisoner that he was beaten by
prison officials stated a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.
The court admitted that such allegations "tax a reader's credulity...
but for passing on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
facts set forth in the complaint must be assumed to be true."80
Even if the federal civil rights statutes give a prisoner an immediate
73. McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Calif. 1955).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 116.
76. Com. of Pa. ex rel. Gatewood v. Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. den. 386 U.S. 925 (1967); U.S. ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410 (7th
Cir. 1963); Mayfield v. Craven, 299 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Calif. 1969).
77. 130 F. Supp. at 115.
78. The elements required to state a cause of action for lack of medical care
under the civil rights appear to be:
(1) an acute physical condition which
(2) requires immediate care and
(3) the total lack of medical care results in permanent injuries.
See note in Stiltner v. Rhay, 371 F.2d 420 (1967). See also Coleman v. Johnston,
247 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); U.S. ex rel. Knight v. Ragen, 337 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1964), cert. den., 380 U.S. 985 (1964).
79. 368 F.2d 992 (1966).
80. Id. at 993.
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cause of action for intentionally inflicted injuries in a state prison, they
do not affect his right to recover damages from the state.81 The
United States Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape"2 held that municipali-
ties were never intended by Congress to be a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Civil Rights Act. 3 Therefore, a prisoner cannot hold a
public entity liable for damages caused by the public employee's un-
lawful actions.
The Arguments For Retaining Section 844.6 of the California Govern-
ment Code
Subdivision (d) of section 844.6 states that a public entity "may but
is not required" to pay judgments against its employees where they are
personally liable.8 4 The Law Revision Commission study supports this
provision because "some public entities have followed the policy of pay-
ing any judgment against an employee who acted in good faith in the
scope of his employment even though the entity would be immune
from direct liability under section 844.6.' '85 In recommending reten-
tion of section 844.6, the Commission study contends that the section
does not result in injustice in actual operation, "but has provided em-
ployees engaged in law enforcement activities with an incentive to ex-
ercise reasonable care towards prisoners.
'"86
The Commission study does not explain how the section provides
such an incentive for employees, but this conclusion appears to be
based on the fact that "some" entities have followed the policy of paying
any judgments against an employee who acted in good faith.87  If the
Commission's conclusion is correct then it should logically follow that
requiring all entities to pay any judgment against their employees will
provide even more incentive to exercise reasonable care toward prison-
ers.
Unless all public entities follow the policy of paying their employ-
ees' judgments, some prisoners will be compensated for their "just"
claims while others might not if the employee cannot pay the judgment
himself. Since each entity is the judge of which claims it will pay, the
standards of good faith will vary with the different public entities. The
satisfaction of the prisoner's judgment may therefore depend entirely
81. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
82. id.
83. Id.
84. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 844.6.
85. 1969 CoMmissioN, Vol. 9, at 825.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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upon which public entity incarcerates him, not upon the righteousness of
his claim.
In addition to the Law Revision Commission's reason for urging re-
tention of section 844.6 it can be argued that public expenditures will
increase and there will be a breakdown in prison discipline without the
immunity for public entities.8  There is evidence that the argument
that entity liability will significantly increase the cost of government
lacks credibility. 89 In 1959 the awards made in the New York state
prison system amounted to slightly over one percent of the total awards
against the state from all tort claims. 0 Justifying the existence of an
immunity for public entities for injuries to prisoners because of a finan-
cial burden seems to be a tacit admission that many prisoners are in-
jured by public employees acting within the scope of their employ-
ment.91
Another argument advanced in support of retaining the principle of
section 844.6 is the threat to discipline if a prisoner could bring an ac-
tion against the entity. The example of the federal government and
some state governments which provide for entity liability 2 can serve
as evidence to challenge the validity of this argument. The United
States Supreme Court, in 1963, held that a federal prisoner could re-
cover damages against the government for the neglience of an employee
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.9 3  The burden of showing that
discipline has disintegrated in the federal prison system since the Court's
decision would be difficult to sustain. If a prisoner's right to sue for
money damages causes a "discipline breakdown", the breakdown should
occur regardless of whom the prisoner sues, the public entity or em-
ployee. Since section 844.6 specifically authorizes a prisoner suit
against the employee, the "discipline breakdown" argument will not
support the entity's immunity; it is difficult to imagine how discipline
could be a problem when a prisoner can sue the entity but not be a
problem when he can sue only the employee.
If any of the arguments for entity immunity are valid, it could be ar-
gued that the entity should be immune from liability for all injuries to
88. See Comment, 19 HAsT. L.J., supra note 44, at 581.
89. Id.
90. 1963 Svpp. TO THE APPENDIX OF THE JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, Government
Tort Liability, 26, table 35.
91. Assaults by guards upon prisoners still occur in California. See J. Ritter,
Nightmare for the Innocent in a California Jail, LIFE, August 15, 1969. See also,
THE SACRAMENTO BEE, LA Sheriff Fires 3 Deputies in Mistreatment of Prisoners,
February 5, 1971, p. B8, col. 1.
92. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, n.16 (1963). New York, Illinois,
North Carolina, and Washington. Louisiana also allows recovery from the state under
the principle of respondeat superior, see Lewis v. State, 176 So. 2d 718 (1965).
93. U.S. v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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prisoners. Yet, subdivisions (b) and (d) of section 844.6 and sections
845.4 and 845.6 provide for entity liability for certain injuries to pris-
oners. 94 These exceptions to the general rule of immunity could result
in unequal compensation of prisoners' injuries. For example, a prisoner
whose hand was injured in a motor vehicle accident where a prison em-
ployee was driving could secure a judgment against the entity.95 But a
prisoner whose hand was injured when a guard slammed a cell door on
it could only secure a judgment against the guard, who may be unable
to pay the judgment.96
Arguments For Repealing Section 844.6
The major argument for repealing section 844.6, in addition to the
weakness of the arguments for retention, is that ultimate responsibility
(liability in tort) for the acts of their employees will compel public en-
tities to hire more qualified police officers and jail guards and to more
closely supervise them.9 7 Professor Foote, in discussing the problems
of tort remedies as a deterrent to police illegality, feels there are three
essential steps to making tort remedies effective deterrents. One step
is governmental liability.
Governmental liability is important not only to provide financially
responsible defendants, but primarily so that the deterrent will be
effective where it is needed-at the level where police policy is
made. If cities are responsible for torts committed by officers who
are known to be vicious and ill-tempered or dangerously insane
or chronically alcoholic, the liability is likely to discourage the re-
tention of such officers and compel a better police force.98
Liability for negligently caused injuries to prisoners should compel pub-
lic entities to institute safety programs. Therefore, it can be argued
that the quality of care should improve with entity liability and the num-
ber of injuries should decrease. 99
Another argument for repeal of section 844.6 is that the morale of
public employees may improve with entity liability. The Law Revision
Commission study apparently recognized this argument when it con-
cluded that section 844.6 should be retained because some entities pay
judgments against their employee's who acted in good faith. 100 But
94. Injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents, medical malpractice, failure to
summon medical care and interference with prisoners' access to courts.
95. CAIL. GoV'T CODE § 844.6(b).
96. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 844.6(a).
97. Foote, supra note 72, at 514.
98. Id.
99. See the study on sovereign immunity prepared for the Law Revision Com-
mission by Professor Van Alstyne in 1963 CoMMissioN, Vol. 5, at 418.
100. See text at note 86.
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the logical extension of the Commission's argument will demonstrate
that the argument is actually one for the repeal of section 844.6. If the
fact that some entities pay judgments against their employees is an incen-
tive for their employees to "exercise reasonable care towards prison-
ers,'"101 then the repeal of section 844.6 will force all entities to pay
such judgments.' 02
It is possible to argue that the personal liability of the employees is
the best incentive to "exercise reasonable care toward prisoners." How-
ever, the repeal of section 844.6 will not absolve the employee of per-
sonal liability.103 Where an employee acts in good faith, his public en-
tity-employer will pay the judgment and the employee will not have to
fear financial loss from "doing his job".10 4 The employee who acts in
bad faith may be forced to indemnify the public entity'0 5 and therefore
will not be encouraged to abuse prisoners because the entity would be
liable in the absence of section 844.6.
Effect of Repeal of Section 844.6
A. Liability for Acts of Public employees.
The repeal of section 844.6 will allow a prisoner to recover damages
from a public entity when he could have recovered from its employee.
0 6
The employee's immunity will usually extend to the entity, but occasion-
ally the entity may be liable where its employee is immune.0 7 The re-
peal of section 844.6 may expose a public entity to liability for an in-
jury to a prisoner caused by a dangerous condition of public property-
the jail. 08  However, section 845.2 of the Government Code provides
that a public entity is not liable for failure to provide a jail or, if one is
provided, for failure to provide sufficient equipment, personnel, or fa-
cilities. The legislature did not intend section 845.2 to absolve an en-
tity of liability for dangerous conditions of public property under sec-
tions 830-835.4 of the Government Code.'0 9 Therefore, the most rea-
sonable interpretation of section 845.2 seems to be that a public entity
is liable for a dangerous condition of its jail, but insufficient equipment,




103. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.
104. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 825.
105. CAL. GOVT CODE § 825.6.
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.2(a).
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(b).
108. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 830-835.4.
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 845.2 and Legislative Committee Comment.
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If a public entity is liable for the acts of its police officers and jail
guards, should there be a distinction made between negligent and in-
tentional acts for purposes of entity liability? California has held mu-
nicipal corporations liable for the intentional torts of their employees
when they acted in the scope of their employment and were engaged in
proprietary activities. 110 The California Tort Claims Act makes no
general distinction for purposes of entity liability between negligent and
intentional acts of the public employee as the Federal Tort Claims Act
does.:" -  Thus, the repeal of section 844.6 would result in a public en-
tity's liability for the intentional as well as negligent acts of its jail
guards. If one of the purposes in imposing liability on the entity is to
protect prisoners from sadistic jailers, there should be no distinction be-
tween negligently and intentionally caused injuries. Making such a
distinction would defeat the very purpose of imposing liability on the
public entity. Of course extension of entity liability includes only com-
pensatory damages and not punitive damages, which could still be re-
coverable from the tortfeasor."1
2
Even though there may be entity liability for the intentional torts of
its employees, not all intentional acts will result in liability. A public
employee is immune from liability for his discretionary acts.1 3  The
amount of force used to enforce prison discipline and prevent riots and
escapes can be labeled "discretionary" and liability would thus be
avoided." 4 However, the California Supreme Court has defined a
discretionary act as one involving basic policy decisions."' Ministerial
acts for which liability exists are those where there is a duty to act."60
The determination of what punishment to impose for violations of
prison regulations may involve policy decisions by prison administrators.
However, enforcement of prison regulations by the guards is a duty im-
posed on them by the nature of their job and therefore the act of "en-
forcing" is ministerial, not discretionary.
Although a public entity may not be able to defend a suit by a pris-
oner on the grounds that an intentional battery by a guard was a dis-
cretionary act, it can assert the employee's defense of a privilege to use
physical force. The California Supreme Court has stated that a guard
110. Ruppe v. City of Los Angeles, 186 Cal. 400 (1921).
111. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). However, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 818.8 provides that a pub.
lic entity is not liable for intentional or negligent misrepresentations of a public em-
ployee.
112. CAL. GoVT CoDE § 818.
113. CAL. GOVT CODE § 820.2. Section 815.2(b) provides for entity immunity
when the employee is immune.
114. Id.
115. Lipman v. Brisbane School District, 55 Cal. 2d 224, 230 (1961); Johnson v.
State of California, 69 Cal. 2d 782 (1968).
116. Id. See also PRossER, supra note 13, at 1015.
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"may use reasonable force upon a prisoner to enforce proper prison
regulations."'117  What constitutes reasonable force will vary with the
factual circumstances of each case. The use of deadly force to prevent
the escape of a felon from a state prison may not be unreasonable.
The California Supreme Court has recognized the problem of main-
taining prison discipline and has imposed the burden of proof upon the
plaintiff-prisoner. 118
Since the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving an intentional
battery by a guard and there is a possible defense of privilege, there
should be no distinction between an employee's intentional and negli-
gent torts for purposes of entity liability. The fact that "courts are and
should be reluctant to interfere with or hamper the discipline . . . in
a prison!"" suggests that all doubts as to the issue of abuse of privilege
will be resolved in favor of the entity.
B. Liability for Injuries Caused by Other Prisoners.
Subdivision (a) of section 844.6 provides that a public entity is not
liable for an injury to a person proximately caused by a prisoner. 20
Thus, for any injury to a prisoner caused by a fellow prisoner the in-
carcerating public entity is not liable. The repeal of section 844.6
could drastically affect an entity's liability for such injuries. The United
States Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Muniz"', held that the federal govern-
ment is liable for injuries sustained in an assault by fellow prisoners
where the plaintiff-prisoner alleges and proves the assault was proxi-
mately caused by a guard's negligence. 2 Would California's public
entities be liable in a similar situation in the absence of section 844.6?
Section 820.8 of the Government Code provides that an employee is
not liable for any injury caused by other persons. Since the entity is
generally immune where the employee is immune, 2 3 the entity would
not be liable even if the employee's negligence was the cause of the as-
sault. However, it is possible that a court could impose liability on an
117. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852 (1962). See also In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.
2d 663 (1961).
118. In re Riddle, 57 Cal. 2d 848, 852 (1962).
119. Id.
120. This language could include injuries to members of the public "caused by a
prisoner". When this provision is read with section 845.8 which says that neither
tities nor employees are liable for injury caused by "escaped or paroled" prisoners,
immunity for injuries to the public by any prisoner appears to be the intent of the
legislature. See Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles, 233 Cal. App. 2d 131 (1965), for
a case where a citizen was injured by escaping prisoners.
121. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
122. Id.
123. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(b) provides for this immunity of the entity when
an employee is immune "except as provided elsewhere by statute." There is no other
statute imposing liability on an entity for acts of prisoners which injure other prisoners.
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employee (guard) if it found there was a duty to prevent assaults in a
jail notwithstanding section 820.8.124 The employing entity could then
be liable under section 815.2 (a) of the Government Code for its em-
ployee's negligence.125 If there is a possibility of public entity liability
for prisoners' assaults upon their fellow prisoners, the repeal of section
844.6 must be given careful consideration.
The burden of financial responsibility for injuries sustained in prison
altercations could be substantial. Since there are many violent men in
prison, the prison system might break down if officials had to segregate
all prisoners with propensities for violent assaults. Most prisons would
not have the facilities for such segregation. Thus, the arguments for
entity immunity may not be totally invalid when applied to the problem
of injuries caused by other prisoners.
Since the California Penal Code protects the person of a prisoner
while he is in custody, it can be argued that there should be a duty to
protect him from criminal assaults by other prisoners.126 The example
of the federal system can again be used to challenge the validity of argu-
ments for entity immunity for injuries caused by other prisoners. Al-
though a federal prisoner can recover from the government for assaults
by his fellow prisoners, he must still prove that the assault was proxi-
mately caused by a guard's negligence, or the government's negligence
in not providing enough guards. 127 In California, a public entity would
not be liable for injuries resulting solely from a failure to provide a
"sufficient" number of guards; therefore, recovery would depend upon
proof of a public employee's negligence or misconduct.128
The right of a prisoner to be free from assaults by fellow prisoners
should be balanced against a public entity's financial burden incurred
in providing and maintaining jails. The standard to be used in deter-
mining whether a public employee has breached his duty to protect pris-
oners in his custody must reflect this balance. The reasonable man test
should provide a satisfactory standard. A prison guard should be liable
only if he failed to act as a reasonable prison guard would have acted in
similar circumstances. The problem then becomes one of providing a
124. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.8 provides that a public employee is not liable for
acts of other persons "except as otherwise provided by statute." However, the section
specifically states that he is liable for his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.
The legislative committee comment seems to indicate that the purpose of this section
was to relieve public officers of liability for the acts of their subordinates. Therefore,
the section should not affect a guard's duty to protect prisoners from other prisoners'
assaults.
125. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(a).
126. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2650.
127. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
128. See text at note 108.
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statute that, in the absence of section 844.6, will clarify a guard's duty
and aid him in acting reasonably.
It seems evident that a prisoner cannot be protected from all crimi-
nal assaults by his fellow prisoners because the government cannot af-
ford to hire a body guard for each prisoner. Therefore, the duty to pro-
tect a prisoner from other prisoners should arise only where prison of-
ficials have actual knowledge that an assault is probable and imminent.
In such a case, a prison employee should take reasonable efforts to seg-
regate the potential participants of the altercation. What constitutes a
reasonable effort to segregate must be determined by the existing facili-
ties and personnel. A public entity arguably should not be liable solely
because the facilities are insufficient to segregate all potential trouble-
makers.
C. Injuries Negligently Caused by Fellow Prisoners
The repeal of section 844.6 would not impose liability on a public
entity for injury to a prisoner negligently caused by a fellow prisoner
unless a public employee or a dangerous condition of public property
contributed to the injury.129 Although the California Penal Code re-
quires prisoners to work in the state prisons and provides that they will
be compensated, the prisoner is not considered an employee of the State
or of the Department of Corrections. 130  A prisoner is not covered by
the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety
Act while he is working in the prison.' 3 '
A provision in the California Labor Code specifically exempts pris-
oners engaged in fire suppression work from the provisions of the Penal
Code.132 Such prisoners are deemed to be public employees and are
protected by workmen's compensation. 3' A prisoner injured by the
negligent act of a fellow prisoner, while both are working in fire sup-
pression, would be compensated under workmen's compensation pro-
visions. 34  However, a public employee-prisoner (one working in fire
suppression) may injure a prisoner not working in fire suppression and
the employing entity could be liable for the injury in the absence of sec-
tion 844.6 if its "employee" (the working prisoner) was negligent. A
situation where such an injury could result is hard to imagine. In most
129. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.
130. CAL. PEN. CODE § 2700.
131. Id.
132. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3365.
133. See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 3365, 4125.12 3300, 3351.
134. 2 WTKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIrA LAW, Workmen's Compensation, § 1
(7th ed. 1960).
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instances both prisoners would be working at suppressing the fire and
the injury would be compensable under workmen's compensation.
Does Section 844.6 Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
Section 844.6 was challenged as violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in Reed v. City and
County of San Francisco.135 The plaintiff argued that
no valid reason exists for classifying prisoners in a different cate-
gory from other citizens who, in certain circumstances, are given a
cause of action against public entities for tortious injuries.1 30
Section 844.6 creates a class of persons, prisoners, who are denied the
right to recover from a public employer solely because of their status
as prisoners. The court of appeal in Reed held that the legislature's
power to control governmental tort liability is "limited only by the rule
that it must not be exercised in an arbitrary manner."'1 7 If any state of
facts can be reasonably conceived to sustain the statute the court should
presume the legislature did not act arbitrarily and the statute does not
violate the due process clause. 38 The court in Reed concluded that the
increased cost of law enforcement and the difficulties of orderly prison
administration were sufficient reasons for finding that the legislature
did not act arbitrarily in enacting section 844.6.
The court appeared to decide the issue of equal protection with the
due process test of whether a state of facts can be reasonably con-
ceived to sustain the legislative determinaton.'8 9  However, it can be
argued that the test for resolving the issue of equal protection is not
whether a state of facts can be reasonably conceived to sustain the
classification, but whether the discrimination between classes bears a
reasonable relationship to the differences between the classes.' 40 If the
classification affects economic rights, it will not be an arbitrary and in-
vidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause if there
is a reasonable basis for the classification. 14" ' But when the discrimina-
tion from classification infringes on fundamental rights, there must be
a compelling state interest to justify the classification.' 4 2  Therefore,
the important issue is whether section 844.6 infringes on a prisoner's
fundamental rights or merely an economic right.




139. Id. at 24, citing Borden Farm Products v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934).
140. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1957); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
141. Id.
142. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 315 U.S. 535 (1942); Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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The United States Supreme Court has upheld the rule of sovereign
immunity.' 43 Therefore, it would appear that there is no fundamental
right to recover damages from a public entity for injuries caused by
the entity's employee. But if a state is going to provide for government
liability in tort, the equal protection clause should protect persons from
discrimination based on arbitrary classification.
The argument can be made that section 844.6 infringes on a prison-
er's fundamental rights because a permanent injury is, at least in part,
a denial of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
144
But even if an injury does result in loss of "life, liberty, and property,"
section 844.6 does not deny compensation for this loss. The section
only limits the remedy for such loss to the employee causing the in-
jury. 4
5
Even if the discrimination against prisoners, inherent in section 844.6,
does not infringe on fundamental rights, there still must be a reason-
able basis for the discrimination.146 The court in Reed did not discuss
the arguments in favor of different treatment for prisoners in tort actions;
the court assumed that problems of prison discipline and increased costs
of law enforcement were sufficient reasons for the discrimination against
prisoners. The weakness of the prison discipline argument has been
pointed out above.' 47  The United States Supreme Court has recently
held that a state cannot preserve the fiscal "integrity of its programs
...by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens."'1 48 There
appears to be no justifiable reason for the discrimination against pris-
oners in tort actions.
Section 844.6 can be challenged on the grounds that it creates a
completely arbitrary classification among prisoners themselves. Section
844.6 creates a class of prisoners, those injured by motor vehicle acci-
dents and medical malpractice, who are given preferred treatment in tort
actions. This class can satisfy personal injury judgments against the
public entity-employer while prisoners injured in other accidents can-
not. 4  This discrimination certainly seems arbitrary and has no rea-
sonable relation to the differences in the injuries.
Conclusion: Proposal for a New Statute
The questionable constitutional validity of section 844.6 and the
143. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
144. 130 F. Supp. at 115.
145. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 844.6.
146. Morey v. Doud, supra note 140.
147. See text at note 84.
148. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
149. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 844.6(a), (b), (d).
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weakness of the justifications for the section suggests that the legislature
should replace or repeal it. In addition, the arguments for public en-
tity liablity in this area appear to outweigh the arguments for immunity.
If one concludes that prisoners have the right to be compensated for in-
juries by public employess as section 844.6 now provides, then there is
no justifiable reason for the immunity of the financially responsible
public employer. Persons other than prisoners have the right to enforce
personal injury judgments against the public employer.
The right of a prisoner to recover damages from a public entity for
injury caused by another prisoner is more debatable. Imposing lia-
bility on the entity for these injuries would go beyond the principle of
respondeat superior. However, where the other prisoner's act which
causes the injury is the result of a breach of some duty by a public em-
ployee, entity liability is not unreasonable or unjustified.
The following is a proposal to replace section 844.6:
(a) A public entity is liable for any injury to a prisoner proxi-
mately caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of said
entity's employee acting within the scope of his employment.
Nothing in this Section shall exonerate a public employee from his
own liability for such act as provided in Article 3 ( commencing
with section 820).
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to deprive an em-
ployee of a prison, jail or other correctional facility of the right to
use reasonable force to maintain discipline and enforce regula-
tions of the facility where the employee is charged with such duty.
Neither a public entity nor a public employee shall be liable for
any injury resulting from the use of such force where necessary.
(c) Neither a public employee nor a public entity shall be liable
for any injury to a prisoner caused by another prisoner unless:
(1) a public employee had actual knowledge of the probable,
imminent occurence of the act resulting in injury, and
(2) the employee fails to take reasonable measures under the
circumstances to prevent the injury.
The first subdivision of this section will give a prisoner the same op-
portunity other persons have to enforce a judgment against the public
entity-employer. Subdivision (b) makes it clear that there is no lia-
bility for injury caused by the use of reasonable force when properly
employed.
Subdivision (c) makes it clear that a prison employee has a duty to
take reasonable measures to prevent intentionally or negligently caused
injury by prisoners. In many prisons assaults among prisoners are al-
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ways "probable". "Imminent" is inserted to avoid an interpretation
which would result in liability when one prisoner attacks another with-
out any prior warning of the attack. This subdivision provides a cause
of action when a prisoner can prove that a guard had prior knowledge
of the attack which injured him. The proposal will not lessen the plain-
tiff-prisoner's burden of proving actual knowledge of the attack by a
guard; this burden may frequently be impossible to sustain. But the
purpose of the proposal is to allow the injured prisoner an opportunity
to assume the burden and prove that a guard's breach of duty contrib-
uted to the injury. The proposal is not intended to solve the prisoner's
problems in proving prior knowledge and unreasonable conduct by a
guard.
Section 844.6 of the Government Code should be replaced by a pro-
vision which will allow a prisoner to recover damages from a public
entity when the prisoner alleges and proves the entity's employee caused
or partially caused the injury. Allowing entity immunity solely on the
grounds that the injured party is a prisoner creates an unjust and un-
necessary classification in our society.
Charles W. Sanders
